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THE SCAPEGOAT: EMTALA AND EMERGENCY 
DEPARTMENT OVERCROWDING 
 
Laura D. Hermer* 
INTRODUCTION 
There is one method of accessing healthcare in the United 
States that is available to each and every person therein, regardless 
of citizenship, wealth, race, ethnicity, gender, or insurance status. 
Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA), most hospitals with an emergency department (ED) 
are obliged under federal law to screen every person who seeks 
emergency medical attention, without regard to his ability to pay.1 
If the person is found to have an emergency condition that could 
result in serious bodily harm or death if left untreated, the hospital 
has a further duty to take whatever measures are necessary to 
stabilize the individual, again without regard to his ability to pay.2 
Viewed from at least one perspective, the goals of EMTALA 
are admirable. Congress enacted EMTALA in 1986 as a response 
to perceived widespread patient dumping by private EDs, often 
onto public EDs.3 Public hospitals, which often rely on significant 
local and state subsidies for funding, traditionally have a mandate 
                                                          
 * Research Professor, Health Law and Policy Institute, Assistant Visiting 
Professor, University of Houston Law Center, and Visiting Professor, Institute 
for the Medical Humanities, University of Texas Medical Branch. The author is 
grateful to the Institute for the Medical Humanities for its generous support 
during her appointment as a Visiting Scholar at the Institute, during which time 
the article was written, and to Bill Winslade, Kirk Smith and Lars Cisek for their 
useful comments and support. 
1 See infra note 20 and associated text. 
2 See infra notes 25-26 and associated text. 
3 See infra note 67 and associated text. 
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to care for patients without ability to pay.4 They chiefly care for 
patients with public insurance sources, usually Medicaid and 
Medicare, and the uninsured. The transfer of uninsured patients to 
public EDs went on for years prior to EMTALA’s passage.5 
Nevertheless, the practice may have increased in the early 1980s6 
due at least in part to new payment limits on federal and state 
health coverage programs.7 Faced with reduced Medicare 
reimbursements in relation to costs, particularly for ED care, 
private hospitals sought to treat fewer public-pay and uninsured 
patients in their EDs.8 
In 1984 and 1985, the press seized upon the issue. Numerous 
articles were published providing anecdotal evidence of patient 
dumping.9 Many of these articles described incidents in which 
                                                          
4 See, e.g., Phyllis E. Bernard, Privatization of Rural Public Hospitals: 
Implications for Access and Indigent Care, 47 MERCER L. REV. 991, 999 (1996); 
JENNIFER HUANG ET AL., AMERICA’S PUBLIC HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS: 
2003 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.naph.org/Content/ContentGroups/Publications1/NAPH_2003_Hospi
tal_Characteristics_Survey.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2006). 
5 Cases document the existence of the practice, although how widespread it 
was appears to have been largely unquantified prior to the 1980s. See, e.g., Le 
Jeune Road Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965); New Biloxi v. 
Frazier, 146 So. 2d 882 (Miss. 1962); Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 
A.2d 175 (Del. 1961); O’Neil v. Montefiore Hosp., 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960). 
See also, e.g., Helen Creighton, Your Legal Risks in Emergency Care, 8 
NURSING 52 (1978); J. F. Horty, Emergency Care—or Lack of It—Can Make a 
General Hospital Liable, 96 MODERN HOSPITAL 103 (Mar. 1961). 
6 See, e.g., R.L. Schiff et al., Transfers to a Public Hospital: A Prospective 
Study of 467 Patients, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 552 (1986). 
7 See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2003)). 
8 For information and further citations concerning the increased financial 
risk that hospitals had to absorb following the implementation of the DRG 
system, see Eric Munoz et al., Source of Admission and Cost: Public Hospitals 
Face Financial Risk, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 696 (1986). 
9 See, e.g., Peter Alshire, Indigent Healthcare Issue Takes Spotlight, 
OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Dec. 29, 1985; Paul Saltzman, Court Says Hospital Must 
Accept Indigent, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 20, 1985, at A1; Richard Saltus, Activists 
Call for Laws Insuring Hospital Care of Indigents, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 
1985, at B5; Bard Lindeman, Some Hospitals Turn Away Uninsured Patients, 
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 22, 1985, at D2; Abigail Trafford, Hospitals: A Sick 
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uninsured patients suffered severe injuries or died because of 
lengthy delays due to the shuffling from hospital to hospital before 
finally ending up at a public ED.10 At the same time, two studies 
were published that helped quantify both the phenomenon and 
effects of patient dumping in two urban areas.11 Because of the 
perception of a significant problem, Congress enacted EMTALA 
in 1986. 
Since its enactment, particularly in the years since the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) began enforcing it 
more vigorously, EMTALA has been controversial among 
physicians, hospitals and healthcare attorneys. Numerous articles 
discuss the sources of controversy, most notably, the interpretation 
of related regulations and case law, and the role that EMTALA has 
allegedly played in contributing to ED overcrowding and closures 
since its enactment.12 
                                                          
Industry, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 18, 1985, at 39; Vicky Cahan, When 
the Patient Can’t Pay the Medical Bill, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 18, 1985, at 59; 
Richard A. Knox, Health Policy: Some Local Hospitals Dump the Uninsured, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 1984; Elizabeth Fee, The Second Sickness: 
Contradictions of Capitalist Healthcare, MONTHLY REV., Feb. 1, 1984, at 49; 
Marc Fisher, Mayor: Hospital “Dumped” AIDS Victim, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 9, 
1983, at A1. 
10 See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. E942 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1985) (statement of 
Rep. Garcia, detailing an article published in the Wall Street Journal); Knox, 
supra note 9. 
11 David U. Himmelstein et al., Patient Transfers: Medical Practice as 
Social Triage, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 494, 495 (1984); R.L. Schiff et al., supra 
note 6. 
12 See, e.g., Sarah Rosenbaum & Brian Kamoie, Finding a Way Through 
the Hospital Door: The Role of EMTALA in Public Health Emergencies, 31 J. L. 
MED. & ETHICS 590 (2003); Robert A. Wanerman, The EMTALA Paradox, 40 
ANN. EMERG. MED. 464 (2002); Loren A. Johnson et al., The Emergency 
Department On-Call Backup Crisis: Finding Remedies for a Serious Public 
Health Problem, 37 ANN. EMERG. MED. 495 (2001); Wendy W. Bera, 
Preventing “Patient Dumping:” The Supreme Court Turns Away the Sixth 
Circuit’s Interpretation of EMTALA, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 616 (1999); David A. 
Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past Imperfect/Future Shock, 8 
HEALTH MATRIX 29 (1998); Arthur L. Kellerman et al., Access of Medicaid 
Recipients to Outpatient Care, 330 N. ENG. J. MED. 1426 (1994); Diana K. 
Falstrom, Decisions Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor 
Act: A Judicial Cure for Patient Dumping, 19 N. KY. L. REV. 365 (1992). 
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Less discussed, however, is EMTALA’s status as a throwback 
to a previous era of charity care, and its role within the larger U.S. 
healthcare system. By mandating potentially uncompensated care, 
EMTALA effectively represents a partial federal codification of 
what was previously a voluntary undertaking by physicians and 
hospitals, made financially feasible through what used to be a 
relatively flexible and multi-tiered reimbursement system.13 
EMTALA, which has been called the “safety net of the safety 
net,”14 became necessary because of a number of diverse factors 
that experienced significant changes in the twenty years or so 
preceding its enactment. These factors include radical changes in 
healthcare organization and finance following the enactment of 
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965,15 governmental action concerning 
issues of race and poverty in the provision of healthcare,16 and, 
most notably, a sharp and steady increase in the number of 
uninsured Americans.17 EMTALA exists, in effect, to help support 
our private and non-universal system of healthcare, based on a 
notion of charity care that is far more tenuous in today’s healthcare 
market than at the time of the statute’s enactment.18 Yet its support 
can no longer secure this country’s continued failure to move to a 
system of universal access, even in conjunction with public 
healthcare programs. 
Part I of this Article briefly discusses EMTALA’s salient 
provisions. Part II examines the history of emergency care and 
changes in healthcare organization and finance affecting the 
provision of charity care—topics which are significant in 
unraveling the alleged effects EMTALA has had on the healthcare 
system. Part III examines policy issues raised by EMTALA within 
our present system of health insurance and healthcare organization 
                                                          
13 See infra Section III.A. 
14 Peter Cunningham & Jessica May, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTHCARE 
CHANGE, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 70: Insured Americans Drive Surge in Emergency 
Department Visits, available at http://hschange.org/CONTENT/613 (last visited 
May 8, 2006). 
15 See infra notes 61-64 and associated text. 
16 See infra notes 73-80 and associated text. 
17 See infra notes 69-72 and associated text. 
18 See infra Section III.A. 
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and finance. It reaches two conclusions. First, EMTALA, while a 
poor and archaic fit with our present system of healthcare delivery 
and finance, in fact has helped to preserve our largely private, 
voluntary system of healthcare. Second, EMTALA is not likely a 
major culprit in the financial woes of private hospitals and in ED 
overcrowding and closures. Rather, greater pressures on the 
healthcare system, pressures that EMTALA itself was meant in 
part to address, are to blame. To solve these problems, U.S. policy 
regarding the nature and provision of healthcare itself must be 
reformed. While there are a number of minor measures concerning 
issues of finance and capacity that could be implemented to 
improve access to emergency care without requiring significant 
changes, a real solution may require greater public financing and 
control of health insurance, and the creation of incentives to 
expand emergency capacity in at least some settings. 
I. EMTALA’S PROVISIONS 
Congress enacted EMTALA in response to a growing public 
perception of patient dumping in the early and mid-1980s. 
EMTALA applies to all hospitals with an ED that have a federal 
contract to provide Medicare services.19 As virtually all hospitals 
with an ED also have a contract with the federal government to 
provide services to Medicare enrollees, the statute therefore applies 
to treatment at virtually all EDs. The statute requires EDs at all 
covered hospitals to screen all ED patients who request treatment 
(or for whom treatment is requested by another party) for an 
“emergency medical condition.”20 An emergency medical 
condition exists when the absence of immediate medical attention 
may be expected to result in the patient’s death or serious harm to 
either a major bodily function or body part.21 
                                                          
19 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) Pub. 
L. No. 99-272, Title IX, § 9121, 100 Stat. 164 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd (1988 & Supp. 1992)). 
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). All hospitals that accept Medicare as 
payment are included under the statute. 
21 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1); see also 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b) (West 2005). It 
also pertains to a woman in labor, where there is not enough time to affect a safe 
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When screening the patient, the ED staff must adhere to the 
same policy it uses in screening any other patient.22 For example, it 
may not lawfully screen an unconscious homeless man differently 
than it would anyone else with similar symptoms. Nor may the ED 
lawfully delay screening to inquire about the individual’s ability to 
pay.23 If the medical personnel who screen the patient find no 
emergency medical condition, then EMTALA imposes no 
obligation upon the ED or its staff to provide the patient with any 
treatment.24 
However, if the patient is found to have an emergency medical 
condition, the ED staff must “stabilize” his condition before 
transferring or discharging him.25 Stabilization entails taking 
                                                          
transfer to another hospital prior to delivery, or where such a transfer would 
place the life or safety of the woman or fetus in jeopardy. 
22 Id. EMTALA does not prescribe any national standard for evaluation or 
treatment. See, e.g., Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 878, 880 
(4th Cir. 1992) (holding that “EMTALA only requires hospitals to apply their 
standard screening procedure . . . uniformly to all patients” and noting with 
respect to screening examinations that Congress “could have clearly specified a 
national standard,” had it wished to do so). 
23 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h). 
24 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(c) (West 2005) 
If an individual comes to a hospital’s dedicated emergency department 
and a request is made on his or her behalf for examination or treatment 
for a medical condition, but the nature of the request makes it clear that 
the medical condition is not of an emergency nature, the hospital is 
required only to perform such screening as would be appropriate for 
any individual presenting in that manner, to determine that the 
individual does not have an emergency medical condition.  
Id. Note additionally that concern regarding medical malpractice issues, which 
are wholly separate from EMTALA, may nevertheless counsel that ED staff 
provide a patient with instructions to consult a physician regarding any non-
emergent condition that the screening examination may turn up, or with other 
orders for treatment or follow-up care. 
25 EMTALA only requires an ED to provide care sufficient to stabilize the 
patient. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (providing that a hospital must 
provide, “within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further 
medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the 
medical condition”). In the case of a woman in labor, “stabilization” means 
delivery of both the fetus and the placenta. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A). 
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whatever medical measures are available and necessary to ensure 
that the individual’s medical condition will not materially 
deteriorate during or as a result of transfer from the facility.26 A 
hospital may forego stabilization and instead transfer an 
unstabilized patient with an emergency medical condition only if 
the patient herself requests a transfer in writing or a physician or 
other authorized medical personnel certifies in writing that the 
benefits to the patient of treatment elsewhere outweigh the risks of 
transfer.27 
Physicians and hospitals that violate EMTALA’s provisions 
are liable for up to $50,000 in civil penalties per violation by the 
federal Office of the Inspector General (OIG).28 In egregious cases, 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) may also 
terminate offenders from participation in Medicare, although this 
rarely happens.29 The statute also provides for a private right of 
action, so a patient harmed by an EMTALA violation may also sue 
a participating hospital.30 
                                                          
26 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A).  
A patient is considered stable for discharge (vs. for transfer from one 
facility to a second facility) when, within reasonable clinical 
confidence, it is determined that the patient has reached the point where 
his/her continued care, including diagnostic work-up, treatment, or 
both, could be reasonably performed as an outpatient or later as an 
inpatient, provided the patient is given a plan for appropriate follow-up 
care with the discharge instructions. 
Id. Loren A. Johnson et al., The Emergency Department On-Call Backup Crisis: 
Finding Remedies for a Serious Public Health Problem, 37 ANN. EMERGENCY 
MED. 495, 495–499 (May 2001) (quoting HCFA, EMTALA STATE OPERATIONS 
MANUAL Tag A 407 (1998)). 
27 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A). In the latter case, the hospital must provide 
appropriate transportation, and must include all relevant medical records. 
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1). 
29 Id. Between 1986 and 2001, only four hospitals have been terminated 
from Medicare for EMTALA violations, and two of those four were later 
reinstated. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMERGENCY CARE: EMTALA 
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 3 (June 2001), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01747.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2006) 
[hereinafter GAO, EMERGENCY CARE]. 
30 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A). This private right of action does not 
include the right to sue physicians or other healthcare providers for alleged 
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II. EMERGENCY CARE IN HISTORICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONTEXT 
To understand the issues posed by EMTALA, some 
background is necessary. First, a brief history of the provision of 
emergency medicine in this country is necessary to better evaluate 
the origins of some of the problems often blamed on EMTALA. 
Second, it is necessary to look briefly at changes in healthcare 
organization and finance that have allowed providers increasingly 
less leeway to shift costs from the uninsured and poorly insured to 
the well insured and wealthy. The actual amount of uncompensated 
care provided by EDs at most voluntary and for-profit hospitals is 
small, even post-EMTALA.31 Nevertheless, the perception of 
providers is that uncompensated care, presumably to the poor, is 
ruining their hospitals. This perception is likely caused in part 
because of restrictions on providers’ ability to cost-shift in 
response to the federal mandate to provide care, even if 
uncompensated, to people with unstable emergency conditions 
who present at the ED.32 Thus, EMTALA’s “unfunded mandate” 
becomes a target for providers’ ire in an increasingly pinched 
system. 
A. A Brief History of Emergency Care 
At the end of the nineteenth century, EDs as we know them 
today did not exist. The majority of healthcare was provided at that 
time by physicians, most of whom delivered care via house-calls.33 
As the quality and efficacy of allopathic medical care improved 
and patients increasingly sought allopathic medical care, 
physicians made fewer house-calls, instead requiring their patients 
to travel to them.34 Meanwhile, with the rise of aseptic technique 
                                                          
EMTALA violations. See id. 
31 See infra note 43 and associated text. 
32 See infra Section II.B. 
33 See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
MEDICINE 68–71 (1982). 
34 Id. at 75-77. 
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and anesthesia, surgical care grew increasingly common.35 The 
need for hospitals as a locus of surgical practice and patient 
recovery grew correspondingly. 
For much of the twentieth century, there were two primary 
types of hospitals: public and private nonprofit.36 Public hospitals 
are institutions funded by the local government for the purpose of 
providing healthcare for impoverished and underserved county 
residents.37 Such hospitals, usually based in larger metropolitan 
areas, have provided the lion’s share of care over the last century 
to the indigent and, in more recent decades, the uninsured. Public 
hospitals continue to form an essential piece of the nation’s safety 
net. In 2003, 60% of patients receiving care at public hospitals 
nationwide were either uninsured or had Medicaid as their source 
of insurance, and 43% of net public hospital revenues came from 
these two payer sources.38 
Private nonprofit hospitals, on the other hand, both could, and 
today still do, discriminate amongst potential patients, whether 
(formerly) on the basis of race or ethnicity, or (both formerly and 
presently) on the perceived or actual ability to pay.39 In 2004, 61% 
of all community hospitals in the United States were private 
nonprofit hospitals, each operating in different environments and 
possessing different missions.40 Generally, they provide care to far 
                                                          
35 Id. at 156–57. 
36 ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH 8-10 (1989). For-
profit hospitals existed, but treated a relatively small number of patients. Id. at 
20. 
37 See HUANG ET AL., supra note 4, at 1-2, 10. 
38 Id. at 8, 12. Note that gross charges for Medicaid accounted for 32 
percent of gross public hospital charges in 2003, whereas Medicaid accounted 
for 37 percent of net public hospital revenues in the same year. Id. at 12. The 
disparity is due to the subsidies that public hospitals, among others, receive from 
Medicaid through disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments. DSH 
payments complicate comparisons with private hospital revenues, short of 
receiving more precise and detailed data. 
39 STEVENS, supra note 36, at 137-38, 310. 
40 See Fast Facts from AHA Hospital Statistics (2005), AMERICAN 
HOSPITAL ASS’N, available at http://www.aha.org/aha/resource_center/ 
fastfacts/fast_facts_US_hospitals.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2006). 
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fewer uninsured and Medicaid patients than do public hospitals.41 
The American Hospital Association’s data for 2003 indicates that 
only 16% of respondent hospitals’ gross revenues (including both 
nonprofit and for-profit private hospitals) came from Medicaid or 
uninsured patients, with the remainder coming from privately 
insured and Medicare patients.42 In contrast to the public hospitals’ 
rate of 21%, private hospitals provided uncompensated care 
equivalent only to about 5% of their gross revenues in 2003.43 
Prior to EMTALA, a minority of states already mandated that 
hospitals provide care in genuine emergencies regardless of a 
patient’s ability to pay. In some states, this rule was set by statute. 
In 1927, Illinois was the first state to enact a law providing that all 
licensed hospitals must provide emergency medical care to those 
who present with an emergent condition.44 A minority of other 
states followed suit over the next fifty years.45 Where actual 
legislation did not exist, the common law sometimes filled the gap. 
In Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove, the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that where a hospital emergency room refused 
to treat an ill child who died shortly thereafter, a hospital could be 
liable for refusing care in an “unmistakable emergency.”46 A 
                                                          
41 Voluntary hospitals in academic teaching centers do provide more 
uncompensated care, on average, than other voluntary hospitals; however, they 
still provide far less than public hospitals. See, e.g., Joel S. Weissman et al., 
Hospitals’ Care of Uninsured Patients During the 1990s: The Relation of 
Teaching Status and Managed Care to Changes in Market Share and Market 
Concentration, 40 INQUIRY 84, 89 (2003). 
42 The Fragile State of Hospital Finances, AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS’N 6, 
available at http://www.ahapolicyforum.org/ahapolicyforum/resources/ 
content/FragileStateChartPack.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 
43 See HUANG ET AL, supra note 4, at 1; see also Joel S. Weissman et al., 
supra note 41, at 89 (providing earlier data). Notably, private hospitals serving 
as a “flagship” hospital for a medical school provided more uncompensated care 
than the norm among private hospitals (6.7 percent, as compared with less than 
5 percent for other private hospitals). Id. 
44 MARGUERITE R. MANCINI & ALICE T. GALE, EMERGENCY CARE AND THE 
LAW 50 (Aspen 1981). But see Schiff et al., supra note 6 (demonstrating that, at 
least in one part of Illinois, the statute apparently had little effect). 
45 MANCINI & GALE, supra note 44, at 50. 
46 54 Del. 15, 23 (1961). 
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number of other jurisdictions followed a version of this rule in 
ensuing years.47 
With the rise of surgical specialties and hospital-based care, 
and a correlating decline in house-calls and after-hours care 
provided by individual physicians, patients increasingly sought 
care for urgent and emergency medical conditions at hospitals. 
Additionally, the development of modern, dedicated emergency 
rooms, staffed around the clock, at hospitals beginning in the 
1960s further encouraged this trend.48 These factors helped give 
rise to the use of EDs as places in which to obtain routine 
ambulatory medical care during off-hours, when both the patient 
and her regular physician were off work.49 Correspondingly, the 
rise in ED use has outstripped the population growth for five 
decades now – significantly longer than EMTALA’s existence.50 
B. Changes in Reimbursement Affecting Uncompensated Care 
Over the past five decades, healthcare finance underwent 
several dramatic changes that affected the provision of emergency 
care. First, by the mid-1950s, many Americans had obtained 
private employment-based health insurance to cover hospital and 
physician care rather than paying out of pocket.51 These policies 
often paid for emergency medical care as part of hospital care, 
                                                          
47 See, e.g., Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 112 Ariz. 104, 106 (1975); 
Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969); Le Juene Road Hosp., Inc. v. 
Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Barcia v. Society of New 
York Hosp., 241 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1963). 
48 See, e.g., Daniel F. Danzl & Benson S. Munger, History of Academic 
Emergency Medicine, SOC’Y FOR ACAD. EMERGENCY MED., available at 
http://www.saem.org/publicat/chap1.htm (last visited May 8, 2006). 
49 See, e.g., Howard R. Kelman & Dorothy S. Lane, Use of the Hospital 
Emergency Room in Relation to the Use of Private Physicians, 66 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1189, 1191 (1976) (finding that 51 percent of suburban individuals 
seeking care in EDs had a regular primary care physician (PCP), but came to the 
ED because the physician was not available at the time that care was needed, 
and that a further 15 percent were referred by their PCP because they needed 
services that the PCP did not offer). 
50 See infra note 114 and associated text. 
51 See STARR, supra note 33, at 338. 
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making a visit to the ED financially feasible as well as 
convenient.52 Hospitals and physicians were largely free to 
determine the amount they charged their patients.53 This permitted 
them to “overcharge” wealthy patients and charge a more modest 
fee to middle-income patients in order to provide a reduced fee or 
charity care for their most impoverished patients.54 As long as 
hospitals were able to attract a sufficiently high proportion of 
moneyed patients, they could afford to provide a certain amount of 
charity care to the indigent. 
Even with the ability to charge patients different prices 
according to ability to pay, private hospitals, even voluntary 
hospitals, provided only a small amount of charity care in the early 
1900s.55 Still, such charity care, which totaled the equivalent of 9 
to 15% of gross revenues in value according to certain local 
estimates, was much higher than that found nationwide by the 
latter part of the century. In 1980, one study found that the value of 
free or uncompensated care totaled the equivalent of less than 5% 
of the gross receipts of voluntary hospitals for that year, as 
compared with about 20% for public hospitals.56 Although studies 
                                                          
52 Cf. Danzl & Munger, supra note 48 (observing that health insurance in 
its early decades, as in the Blue Cross model, covered hospital care rather than 
physician office visits, and attributing this fact as a factor in the dramatic rise in 
ED use from the 1950s through 1970). 
53 See, e.g., STARR, supra note 33, at 375–78. 
54 See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 36, at 108. 
55 For example, in San Francisco in 1922, only 9 percent of the patient days 
in voluntary hospitals were provided free of charge; 77 percent were full pay 
and the remainder were paid in part. See STEVENS, supra note 36, at 107 (citing 
EMERSON & PHILIPS, HOSPITALS AND HEALTH AGENCIES OF SAN FRANCISCO 48 
(1923)). In Illinois in 1917, 77 percent of patients paid the full fee, whereas 15 
percent paid nothing and 9 percent paid only part of their charges. Id. at 32 
(citing STATE OF ILLINOIS, REPORT OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 85, 87 (1919)). 
56 Drew E. Altman & Douglas H. Morgan, The Role of State and Local 
Government in Health, 2 HEALTH AFFAIRS 7, 13 (1983) (citing Jack Hadley et 
al., Care for the Poor and Hospital Financial Status: Results of a 1980 Survey of 
Hospitals in Large Cities, URBAN INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER NO. 144402 
(1983)). See also Frank A. Sloan et al., Identifying the Issues: A Statistical 
Profile, in UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 23 
(Samuel H. Boyer et al, eds., 1986) (finding similar results). But note that some 
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have shown slight fluctuations, the present value of 
uncompensated care for private hospitals (including for-profits) 
remains at the equivalent of about 4.5 to 5% of gross receipts.57 
As a second significant change, Medicare and Medicaid, 
enacted in 1965, provided coverage to the elderly and the 
“deserving” poor—two groups that previously had often had 
limited access to healthcare.58 As with private health insurance, 
Medicare and Medicaid afforded ED access, thus increasing the 
spectrum and number of individuals who could seek care at an ED 
and reasonably expect to obtain it.59 Medicare further reimbursed 
at the rate charged by each individual provider.60 One would 
expect that hospitals’ ability to provide emergency care to all 
comers would correspondingly rise with an increase in the pool of 
paying patients obtaining care on a fee-for-service basis. This is 
not, however, ultimately how Medicare, in particular, affected the 
provision of uncompensated care in EDs. 
Rather, in 1983, facing skyrocketing medical costs, the federal 
government implemented the Medicare Prospective Payment 
System.61 This system set Medicare’s compensation according to a 
complex system of reimbursement, based on diagnosis related 
groups (DRGs).62 The inception of the DRG system was the 
beginning of the end of the prior system in which providers 
charged their patients differing amounts based in part on ability to 
pay, as it capped the upper end for charges. Medicare 
reimbursement fluctuated and in most years rose at a lower rate 
                                                          
researchers in the Lewin Group, among others, observe that calculating 
provision of charity care can vary from state to state, so any national data should 
be taken with some skepticism. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Lewin & Timothy J. 
Eckels, Setting the Record Straight, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. (1988); Gary 
Claxton et al., Public Policy Issues in Nonprofit Conversions: An Overview, 16 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 9, 15 (1997). 
57 See supra note 43 and associated text. 
58 See, e.g., Theodore Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, Rethinking 
Medicare Reform, 17 HEALTH AFFAIRS 52, 60 (1998). 
59 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f(d)(1); 1395n(b)(1) (West 2005). 
60 See, e.g, STARR, supra note 33, at 375. 
61 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248 
(codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww). 
62 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(a), (b) (West 2006). 
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than medical inflation generally.63 With managed care’s 
ascendance and a corresponding decline in fee-for-service 
medicine, insurers, meanwhile, often contracted with providers to 
reimburse at a certain percentage above the Medicare 
reimbursement.64 As a result, providers lost a degree of their prior 
ability to engage in fee-shifting. Compounding this problem, the 
federal government implemented rules requiring that providers 
refrain from discounting a significant percentage of their non-
Medicare business, and penalized providers for discounting or 
writing off the patient-provided portion of their Medicare fees if 
they failed to provide a corresponding discount on the 
government’s portion of the fee.65 While both issues have 
subsequently been clarified or revised to give providers greater 
leeway in providing discounts to patients with less ability to pay, 
they arguably contributed to the chilling effect Medicare generally 
had on fee shifting.66 With less latitude to shift fees, providers had 
                                                          
63 See National Health Expenditures Web Tables, Table 13, CTR. FOR 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES (CMS), (2006), available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/ downloads/tables.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2006). 
64 See, e.g., Thomas L. Gift et al., Is Healthy Competition Healthy? New 
Evidence of the Impact of Hospital Competition, 39 INQUIRY 45, 53 (2002). 
65 See 42 CFR § 1001.701(a)(1). 
66 While CMS has issued proposed regulations clarifying that providers 
may offer reduced or free care to uninsured or underinsured patients, it has not 
yet finalized them. See, e.g., Medicare and Federal Healthcare Programs: Fraud 
and Abuse; Clarification of Terms and Application of Program Exclusion 
Authority for Submitting Claims Containing Excessive Charges, 68 Fed. Reg. 
53939, 53941 (proposed Sept. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001). 
Nevertheless, it issued a notice in 2005, instructing providers that:  
No OIG [Office of the Inspector General] authority, including the 
Federal anti-kickback statute, prohibits or restricts hospitals from 
offering discounts to uninsured patients who are unable to pay their 
hospital bills. In addition, the OIG has never excluded or attempted to 
exclude any provider or supplier for offering discounts to uninsured or 
underinsured patients under the permissive exclusion authority at 
section 1128(b)(6)(A) of the Act. 
OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. 
4858-01, 4872-73 (Jan. 31, 2005). Providers may therefore offer free or 
reduced–fee care to patients who are uninsured or underinsured without fear of 
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fewer incentives to give free or reduced-cost care to patients, 
whether in the ED or elsewhere. 
III. POLICY ISSUES INVOLVING EMTALA: ACCESS TO CARE AND 
OVERCROWDING 
EMTALA was enacted in the midst of significant changes in 
the organization and financing of healthcare and health insurance. 
At the time, charity care was waning while, simultaneously, the 
need for such care was rising. Meanwhile, medicine as a large and 
rapidly growing business was on the upswing. Yet EMTALA, as 
we shall see, harkens to an older era, one in which medical 
altruism arguably played a stronger role than it does today. This 
contrast has contributed to medical, social, and economic 
discomfort with the Act, which in turn has led to the scapegoating 
of the Act as the cause of a variety of social and economic ills 
within healthcare. 
EMTALA, contrary to conventional wisdom, does not appear 
to be a significant cause of any of these problems. Rather, as we 
shall see, EMTALA provides a lens through which other, more 
widespread issues with our healthcare system become magnified. 
A. EMTALA and Access to Healthcare 
Patient dumping, where it occurs, can be a serious problem for 
the health and safety of public-pay and uninsured patients. 
Congress clearly intended EMTALA to help ameliorate this 
problem. EMTALA was meant to provide an “adequate first 
response to a medical crisis” for all ED patients and to “send a 
clear signal to the hospital community . . . that all Americans, 
regardless of wealth or status, should know that a hospital will 
provide what services it can when they are truly in physical 
distress.”67 The American public generally expects that everyone 
can at least receive emergency medical care when necessary, 
                                                          
reprisal from CMS, whether through reduction of their “usual charges,” or 
through exclusion from Medicare. Id.  
67 131 CONG. REC. S13904 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. Bob 
Dole). 
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regardless of his or her ability to pay, as it literally can mean the 
difference between life and either sudden death or severe 
disability. EMTALA codified that expectation, based on the 
longstanding ethical duty of healthcare providers to give charity 
care. Yet it did so at a time when not only the need for charity care 
was increasing due to a rising lack of health insurance, but also 
physicians’ and hospitals’ abilities to provide such care without 
substantial economic pain was declining due to changes in 
reimbursement. 
The ED provides ready medical and surgical assistance for 
those who lack a regular source of care. Both lack of health 
insurance and racial minority status independently correlate with a 
dearth in regular sources of care.68 As recently as the 1970s, the 
vast majority of the American public had access to some form of 
health insurance, whether public or private. In 1970, approximately 
94% of Americans under age sixty-five had at least partial 
coverage.69 In the mid-1970s, however, this began to change as 
healthcare costs rose at double-digit rates. By 1992, 15% of the 
U.S. population was uninsured.70 This percentage remained 
relatively static or rose throughout the 1990s and into the present 
century.71 By 2004, 45.8 million Americans were uninsured, 
comprising 15.6% of the population.72 
                                                          
68 Marsha Lillie-Blanton & Catherine Hoffman, The Role of Health 
Insurance Coverage in Reducing Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare, 24 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 198 (2005). 
69 See Evolution of Present Private Health Insurance Coverage, 51 CONG. 
DIG. 34, 35 (1972). 
70 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Historic Health Insurance Tables, Table HI-1 
(2004), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/historic/ 
hihistt1.html (last viewed Feb. 24, 2006). 
71 Id. While the percentage appears to drop starting in 1999, this is due to a 
change in how the uninsured were calculated in the 2000 census. See ROBERT J. 
MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2001, 20 (2002), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-220.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2006). 
72 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004, 16 (2005), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2006). 
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People of color are also more likely to be uninsured. While 
people of color comprised 34% of the U.S. population in 2003, 
they accounted for 52% of the uninsured.73 A number of studies 
examining different populations in the U.S. have found a 
correlation between lack of a regular source of healthcare and 
increased ED use.74 
Teasing apart the separate impact of race and perceived or 
actual economic status on the access and receipt of emergency care 
can be difficult.75 The widespread integration of private hospitals 
in the late 1960s did not solve all the problems with respect to 
either racial or economic prejudice in the provision of health 
services.76 Now, the problems are, as David Barton Smith notes, 
“subtler and more difficult to untangle from the economic 
imperatives faced by providers.”77 The 1960s saw a rise in the 
number of cases brought against hospitals for failure to provide 
emergency medical care.78 A number of studies have additionally 
                                                          
73 MILLS, supra note 71, at 199. 
74 See, e.g., David C. Brousseau et al., Association Between Infant 
Continuity of Care and Pediatric Emergency Department Utilization, 113 
PEDIATRICS 738, 739-40 (2004); William G. Johnson & Mary E. Rimsza, The 
Effects of Access to Pediatric Care and Insurance Coverage on Emergency 
Department Utilization, 113 PEDIATRICS 483, 484 (2004); Roger A. Rosenblatt 
et al., The Effect of the Doctor-Patient Relationship on Emergency Department 
Use Among the Elderly, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 97, 98 (2000). 
75 See, e.g., David Mechanic, Disadvantage, Inequality, and Social Policy, 
21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 48, 54 (2002). 
76 As recently as the 1950s, African-Americans, among certain other races, 
had few options for hospital care, other than in county hospitals and, where they 
existed, historically black hospitals. Following Medicare’s implementation in 
1966, President Lyndon Johnson launched a Medicare Title VI certification 
effort, in which hospitals were required to integrate in order to qualify for 
Medicare reimbursement. Economics won out over prejudice. According to 
David Barton Smith, “more than 1,000 hospitals quietly integrated their medical 
staffs, waiting rooms, and hospital floors in less than four months.” See David 
Barton Smith, Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities and the Unfinished Health 
Agenda, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 317, 319-20 (2004). 
77 DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTHCARE DIVIDED 335 (Univ. of Mich. 
Press, 1999). 
78 See, e.g., Richard v. Adair Hosp. Found. Corp., 566 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 
App. 1978); Fabian v. Matzko, 344 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. 1975); Hill v. Ohio 
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found both racial and class-related disparities in care provided to 
those patients who successfully obtained medical care in EDs.79 
Given the disproportionate ED use in minority communities—
particularly in poor African American and Latino communities—
intentional and unintentional discrimination historically has been 
and continues to be a real issue in the provision of emergency 
care.80 
EMTALA has improved but not solved these problems. There 
exist numerous horror stories of physicians and hospitals that 
refused to evaluate or treat very sick patients due to a real or 
perceived lack of health insurance or other impermissible issues, 
even following the passage of the statute.81 When properly 
                                                          
Cty., 468 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. App. 1970); Standurf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 
1969); Ruvio v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 186 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1966). Note that the rise in published cases of course may not mirror a rise in 
actionable events, but rather may reflect other factors, such as increasing 
visibility of the issue or increased access to the courts for plaintiffs in such 
cases. 
79 See, e.g., Janice C. Blanchard et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in 
Health: An Emergency Medicine Perspective, 10 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 
1289 (2003); Jeffrey J. Bazarian et al., Ethnic and Racial Disparities in 
Emergency Department Care for Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, 10 ACAD. 
EMERGENCY MED. 1209 (2003); Arvind Venkat, The Impact of Race on the 
Acute Management of Chest Pain, 10 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1199 (2003). 
80 See, e.g., Patrick H. Tyrance et al., Emergency Department Costs: No 
Emergency, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1866 (1996). 
81 See, e.g., Mark Taylor, EMTALA Cases Slowing Down, 34 MOD. 
HEALTHCARE 19 (July 26, 2004). To take just one example, in the late 1980s, a 
California physician turned away a Romani (gypsy) man at the ED who had 
likely just had a heart attack. In defense of his action, the physician claimed that 
when a Romani comes to the ED, scores of their family members also come, 
filling the waiting room, loitering, picking pockets and generally causing a 
ruckus. They also, the physician claimed, tend not to be insured. On the strength 
of his negative stereotypes about Roma, the physician told the man (and his 
numerous family members) to go to another hospital, several miles away. The 
man died en route to the second hospital. No charges were ever filed against 
either the physician or the hospital (although the physician recounted having to 
call security for protection, as the man’s relatives later returned to the hospital 
with knives, seeking revenge). Interview with Anonymous Physician (1992). 
Note that the Supreme Court ruled that proof of improper motive (such as those 
evidenced in this example) is not necessary in order to make out an EMTALA 
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enforced, EMTALA can help prevent such incidents from taking 
place, and punish them when they do occur. 
EMTALA is admittedly direct, and thus, in a certain sense, 
intuitive. If the problem is conceived simply as a failure of 
physicians and hospitals to carry out their charitable duties with 
respect to the poor, then EMTALA accomplishes the task. 
According to the congressional record, it appears that Congress 
perceived the provision of emergency care to indigents as a 
professional or moral obligation on healthcare providers that some 
were shirking. The existence of such an obligation is nothing new. 
Physicians have had an ethical obligation since at least the Middle 
Ages to provide general charity care.82 It was first formalized for 
allopathic physicians in the United States in the 1847 American 
Medical Association (AMA) Code of Ethics.83 While the Code 
notes that “the office of physician can never be supported as an 
exclusively beneficent one,” it prohibits physicians from providing 
free care to the affluent, suggests that payment should be 
conditioned on the ability of the patient to pay, and states that 
physicians should “cheerfully and freely” provide free care to the 
indigent.84 Drawing on this history, the House Committee Report 
on EMTALA remarked that it “want[ed] to provide a strong 
assurance that pressures for greater hospital efficiency are not to be 
construed as license to ignore traditional community 
responsibilities and loosen historic standards.”85 
One could question whether EMTALA would be enacted again 
today, if nothing had been done in 1985 and if we were today faced 
with the same evidence and public opinion regarding the matter as 
we were in the 1980s. It is not merely a matter of the policy 
choices currently being made by Congress and the present federal 
Administration. Rather, it has more to do with the gradual shift this 
country has seen in its conception of healthcare and those who 
                                                          
violation. See Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, 525 U.S. 249, 253 (1999). 
82 See, e.g., Karen Geraghty, The Obligation to Provide Charity Care, in 
PROFESSING MEDICINE 57 (American Medical Ass’n eds., 2002). 
83 Id. at 57–58. 
84 American Medical Ass’n (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics, Ch. II, Art. V, 
§ 9; Ch. III, Art. I, § 3 (May 1847). 
85 H.R. Rep. 99-241(I) (July 31, 1985). 
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provide care over the past five decades or so. 
Healthcare has, in this country, always had a shared status as a 
commodity and as a public good. The 1847 AMA Code of Ethics 
demonstrates this tension: physicians, who rely for their livelihood 
upon payment for the services they provide, are nevertheless 
ethically obliged to provide charity care to those in need.86 The 
balance between the two has shifted variously over the years. 
During the past five decades in particular, this balance has tilted far 
more towards the “commodity” end of the scale, although the 
conception of healthcare as a public good still exists.87 As noted 
above, charity care has substantially waned in the face of 
significant alterations in physician and hospital reimbursement.88 
At the same time, federal and state governments are increasingly 
seeking to pull back from guaranteed rights to healthcare for 
certain members of the population.89 Even the current AMA Code 
of Ethics no longer obligates physicians to provide free care to the 
indigent.90 Nevertheless, some physicians do still provide charity 
care, and the United States still guarantees, at least for now, a 
certain amount of healthcare to particular classes of low-income, 
elderly, disabled or indigent individuals. 
It is likely that concern for the indigent and those with public 
insurance was not the only force behind approval of EMTALA. 
Patients had been turned away from private EDs due to lack of 
insurance long before EMTALA was ever contemplated.91 While 
                                                          
86 See AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Ch. II, Art. V, § 9; Ch. III, Art. I, § 3. 
87 See generally John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 311 (1997); David M. Frankford, Privatizing Healthcare: 
Economic Magic to Cure Legal Medicine, 66 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1992). 
88 See supra notes 61-66 and associated text. 
89 The increased use of Section 1115 waivers in Medicaid, particularly with 
respect to defined contribution plans such as that presently being implemented 
in Florida and considered elsewhere, forms one aspect of this phenomenon. See, 
e.g., John V. Jacobi, Dangerous Times for Medicaid, 33 J. L. MED. ETHICS 834, 
838–41 (2005). 
90 Rather, it instead mandates that “a physician shall support access to 
medical care for all people,” without specifying the manner in which a physician 
should carry out that duty. See AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, IX (2001). 
91 See, e.g., Lisa M. Enfield & David P. Sklar, Patient Dumping in the 
Hospital Emergency Department: Renewed Interest in an Old Problem, 8 AM. J. 
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many states had adopted laws prohibiting certain transfers or 
requiring EDs to provide a minimum of care to all comers, the 
majority of states had not yet done so by the time EMTALA was 
enacted.92 The problem that came to a head in the 1980s was not 
merely that uninsured and publicly insured patients were unable to 
receive medical care in emergencies, and suffered serious injuries 
or death as a result. This indeed was true, and unquestionably 
concerned Congress.93 However, there was another concern. 
Patients who were turned away from private EDs were often 
redirected to EDs at public hospitals, or otherwise ultimately 
showed up there for treatment.94 Public hospitals have a legal duty 
to provide care for the indigent, and traditionally serve Medicare 
and Medicaid patients, among others. The cost of care for 
uninsured and underinsured patients seen at public hospitals 
largely comes out of local, and to a lesser extent, state and federal 
coffers.95 Congress, when debating the act, was arguably aware of 
this issue, despite the fact that it does not appear that Congress 
expressly considered any hard figures concerning the public cost of 
caring for these patients.96 Congress was further aware that 
                                                          
L. & MED. 561, 567 (1988) (noting that, under the common law of most states, 
hospitals were generally allowed to refuse to initiate care for a prospective 
patient, no matter how dire the person’s need). 
92 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 99-241, pt. 3, at 6 (discussing Pub. Law 99-272) 
(1986). 
93 131 CONG. REC. S13892-01 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy). 
94 See Schiff et al., supra note 6; Himmelstein et al., supra note 11. 
95 Unlike the local share, in particular, the federal share is indirect, and 
usually comes in the form of Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments. 
Note as well that, in 1983, Congress considered providing $52 million to public 
hospitals to help cover emergency medical care expenses for indigent patients, 
but ultimately declined to do so. See H.R. Conf. Rept. 98-44 (discussing Pub. 
Law 98-8) (Mar. 21, 1983). 
96 See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. S13892-01 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) 
(statement of Sen. Durenberger); 132 CONG. REC. E 177 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 
1986) (statement of Rep. Stark). At least two senators expressly observed in 
their statements concerning the act that Medicare’s prospective payment system, 
as well as changes geared towards instilling more competition in the healthcare 
market, would result in less fat in the system, and accordingly less charity care. 
131 CONG. REC. S13892-01 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statements of Senators 
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EMTALA was merely a stopgap measure, a way of ensuring that 
the growing millions of uninsured and publicly insured Americans 
were able to obtain care in a genuine medical emergency without 
requiring a complete overhaul of the American system of 
healthcare insurance and finance.97 As such, EMTALA not only 
helped guarantee that the uninsured and publicly insured could 
receive care in an emergency, but also that the cost of providing 
such care was borne by both the private and public sectors. 
B. EMTALA, ED Overcrowding and Financial Constraints 
Some physicians and other commentators allege that EMTALA 
has led to a sharp increase in “inappropriate” ED use by the 
uninsured and others. Since even the indigent must at least be 
given a medical screening examination if they present at an ED 
with a medical complaint, the conventional wisdom is that the 
indigent are to blame for problems with ED overuse and 
insolvency.98 One commentator notes that, 
Since EMTALA was enacted, emergency department use 
has surged from 85 million visits per year to almost 110 
million visits per year, while more than 550 hospitals and 
1,100 EDs closed, as did many trauma centers, maternity 
wards, and tertiary referral centers. Ninety percent of the 
remaining trauma centers are currently overwhelmed. 
Ninety percent of our larger hospitals have saturated their 
                                                          
Durenberger and Proxmire). 
97 131 CONG. REC. S13892-01 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy). 
[T]he environment of medical practice is changing dramatically. 
Hospitals are insecure about their futures. They are more reluctant than 
before to offer care for which they may not be compensated. At the 
same time, there are more people who have no health insurance and 
cannot pay for healthcare. These larger problems demand solutions. But 
we must not wait for complete solutions. It is imperative that all 
emergencies be treated appropriately today. 
Id. 
98 See, e.g., Robert A. Bitterman, Explaining the EMTALA Paradox, 40 
ANN. EMERGENCY MED. 470, 470-75 (2002). 
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capacity for treating patients, primarily because of the lack 
of inpatient critical care beds and the nurses to staff them. 
Emergency medical services (EMS) diversion is rampant, 
most EDs are overcrowded, waiting times have increased 
33%, and the number of individuals seeking emergency 
care who leave the ED before being seen has tripled in 
some areas of the country. Liability costs are soaring and 
malpractice insurance may not even be available in many 
states, such as Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Nevada, and 
Florida.99 
If only EMTALA had not been enacted, so the conventional 
wisdom goes, these problems would either not exist, or would be 
substantially reduced.100 
This perception has been widespread. In 1992, the U.S. Senate 
asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to do a national study 
of the problem of overcrowding in hospital EDs.101 It was an 
opinion study, measuring the beliefs of administrators and others 
within the emergency department only. The study found that those 
surveyed believed the problem to be caused largely by people 
seeking non-urgent care.102 According to the data in the GAO 
                                                          
99 Id. (citations omitted). 
100 See, e.g., Robert Schafermeyer et al., Political Issues in Emergency 
Medicine: The United States, 16 EMERG. MED. AUSTRALASIA 183, 186–88 
(2004); Bruce Siegel, The Emergency Department: Rethinking the Safety Net for 
the Safety Net, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Mar. 24, 2004), at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w4.146v1/DC1?maxtosho
w=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&author1=siegel&fulltext=emtal
a&andorexactfulltext=and&searchid=1140124486899_3572&FIRSTINDEX=0
&resourcetype=1&journalcode=healthaff (last visited Feb. 16, 2006); V. George 
Velianoff, Overcrowding and Diversion in the Emergency Department: The 
Healthcare Safety Net Unravels, 37 NURSING CLINICS N. AM. 59 (2002). 
101 Lynne D. Richardson et al., Emergency Department Crowding as a 
Health Policy Issue: Past Development, Future Directions, 40 ANN. 
EMERGENCY MED. 388, 388-93 (2002) (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS: UNEVENLY AFFECTED BY GROWTH AND 
CHANGE IN PATIENT USE (Jan. 1993), available at 
http://161.203.16.4/d36t11/148331.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2002)) [hereinafter 
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS]. 
102 Id. 
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report, 43% of all ED patients in 1990 had illnesses or injuries 
classified as non-urgent, particularly those seen in rural or small 
EDs.103 Uninsured and Medicaid patients were believed to have 
significantly accounted for much of the growth in non-urgent ED 
use.104 88% of the patients with non-emergent conditions allegedly 
went to the ED even though they had other sources of healthcare 
available in the community.105 Emergency departments cited a lack 
of a primary care physician as the reason for ED use in 42% of the 
non-urgent cases they saw in 1990.106 If based on hard data, that 
would amount to fifteen million inappropriate ED visits in one year 
alone.107 According to the report, 37% of ED patients who did not 
have a primary care provider in 1990 were either uninsured or on 
Medicaid.108 Particularly in rural areas, patients with a primary 
care provider used EDs for after-hours non-urgent care.109 Delays 
in care were most often seen in large urban EDs.110 
                                                          
103 Id. at 4, 20. Emergent conditions totaled 17 percent. The remaining 40 
percent of cases constituted time-sensitive urgent conditions. Id. at 19. 
104 Id. at 19. Hospitals also cited an increase in the use of EDs by the 
elderly and an increase in serious illnesses and injuries as major factors in the 
increase in ED use. Id. 
105 Id. at 4–5. 
106 Id. at 21. 
107 Id. There were approximately 38 million ED visits in 1990. Id. 
108 EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS, supra note 101, at 5. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 6. Note, on the other hand, that a recent study shows that, contrary 
to popular belief, ED overcrowding is caused in part by a significant increase in 
the rate of ED use by privately insured patients, not by uninsured patients. The 
rate of ED use for the uninsured rose at a rate comparable to Medicare 
patientsabout 10 percentwhen comparing the years 1996–1997 and 2000–
2001. See Cunningham & May, supra note 14, at 2; see also, e.g., Stephen 
Zuckerman & Yu-Chu Shen, Characteristics of Occasional and Frequent 
Emergency Department Users: Do Insurance Coverage and Access to Care 
Matter?, 42 MED. CARE 176 (Feb. 2004) (finding that “[t]he uninsured do not 
use more ED visits than the insured population as is sometimes argued”). ED 
use by those with private insurance increased, on the other hand, by 24 percent, 
even though the number of individuals who were privately insured increased 
only 4.1 percent over the same period. See Cunningham & May, supra note 14, 
at 2. Given that approximately two-thirds of the American public is covered by 
private health insurance, this indicates that the insured, rather than the 
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Despite the 1992 GAO report’s conclusion that ED 
overcrowding was largely due to an increase in non-urgent, 
uninsured patients, the actual cause of overcrowding appears to be 
multi-factorial, and may not in fact stem significantly from 
EMTALA’s enactment at all. First, while the volume of ED 
patients has increased at a higher rate than has the U.S. population 
since EMTALA was enacted, this trend is nothing new. ED visits 
in 2000 through 2001 had increased 16.3% over visits in 1996 
through 1997, whereas the total population had increased only 
4.4% during the same time.111 This parallels a trend observed 
earlier in the 1990s.112 Yet if one looks back even further, one 
finds that this trend has a much longer history, predating 
EMTALA by at least a few decades.113 According to at least one 
study, per capita ED visit rates rose 550% between 1955 and 1980, 
as compared with a 30% per capita increase in hospital inpatient 
use during the same time period and no appreciable per capita 
increase in physician office visits.114 Additionally, a more recent 
study using national statistics from patient encounters rather than 
opinion data found that it is largely privately insured and Medicaid 
patients who are most responsible for the rising numbers.115 This 
study found that patients with private health insurance or Medicare 
accounted for nearly 66% of the increase in ED visits between the 
study years of 1996 through 1997 and 2001 through 2002.116 
Population increase in general accounted for 25% of the increase in 
visits.117 Visits by the uninsured, conversely, accounted for only 
                                                          
uninsured, may significantly be contributing to ED overcrowding. 
111 See Cunningham & May, supra note 14, at 2. See also Wanerman, supra 
note 12. 
112 See, e.g., GAO, EMERGENCY CARE, supra note 29, at 9. 
113 See, e.g., Jerry E. Bishop, Data Shows Decline in Annual Increase in 
Hospital Emergency Room Use, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1977, at X (reporting that 
ED use had increased only by 6 percent in 1976, as compared to average annual 
increases of 14 percent in the early 1970s). 
114 See, e.g., Kevin F. O’Grady, et al., The Impact of Cost Sharing on 
Emergency Department Use, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 484 (Aug. 22, 1985). 
115 See, e.g., Cunningham & May, supra note 14. 
116 Id. at 1. 
117 Id. 
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about 11% of the increase.118 Emergent or urgent visits accounted 
for 47% of the visits during the study period, with semi-urgent, 
non-urgent and visits of unknown triage classification accounting 
for the remainder.119 
Second, during the 1990s in particular, the total number of 
hospitals and EDs declined in an effort to cut costs and “improve 
efficiency”: e.g., promote a high census, or hospital occupancy 
rate.120 Unoccupied beds earn no revenue and cost the hospital 
money to maintain staff and other operating costs. This is a 
particularly significant consideration for both nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals, both of which compete in an often aggressive 
healthcare market, with hospital chains increasingly taking hold in 
the 1990s.121 Accordingly, the number of inpatient beds declined in 
                                                          
118 Id. at 2. 
119 Id. at 3. Medicare patients are an exception here, with 57 percent of their 
visits in this study reported to be emergent. Id. Note that, because approximately 
25 percent of all ED visits were of unknown triage classification, it is possible 
that more visits were in fact of an emergent or urgent nature than captured by 
the data. See id. 
120 Wanerman, supra note 12, at 461 (citing AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS’N, 
Emergency Departments - An Essential Access Point to Care, TRENDWATCH 
(Mar. 2001)); AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS’N (AHA), CRACKS IN THE 
FOUNDATION: AVERTING A CRISIS IN AMERICA’S HOSPITALS 4 (Aug. 2002) 
[hereinafter CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION]. The notion that EMTALA may be 
financially responsible for the hospital and ED closures cited above may be 
misplaced. At least one study indicates that, while they lost an average of $84 
per ED patient in 2002, California hospitals may have recouped those losses 
from the additional revenue they gained through hospital admissions from the 
ED, which averaged $1,220 in profit per patient. See GLENN A. MELNICK ET AL., 
CALIFORNIA’S EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS: DO THEY CONTRIBUTE TO HOSPITAL 
PROFITABILITY? 2 (2003), available at http://www.chcf.org/ 
topics/view.cfm?itemID=21192. The study in question, however, did not 
evaluate public and private EDs separately, and also omitted Level I trauma 
centers, which are more likely to be in major urban centers and be part of a 
public hospital. As such, it may overstate the average revenues generated at 
hospitals that see predominantly more uninsured and public-pay patients, 
notwithstanding EMTALA. 
121 For more on the growth of hospital chains, see David Blumenthal & Joel 
S. Weissman, Selling Teaching Hospitals to Investor-Owned Hospital Chains: 
Three Case Studies, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 158, 158 (2000); Jack Needleman et 
al., Hospital Conversion Trends, 16 HEALTH AFFAIRS 187, 188-91 (1997). 
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this period—as they have, in fact, historically in most years since 
hitting a peak of 1.7 million in 1965.122 The decline in inpatient 
beds means fewer beds are available to acutely ill patients admitted 
through the ED, who must then wait in the ED for an inpatient bed 
to become available.123 It is the acutely ill patients, moreover, who 
consume the largest share of ED time and resources.124 The child 
with a mild upper respiratory ailment, on the other hand, ultimately 
requires far less of an ED provider’s time, as well as ED bed space. 
The percentage of severely ill patients seeking care through the 
ED is on the rise.125 Fewer inpatient beds, in conjunction with 
increased ED use and increased severity in the types of conditions 
seen, can translate into longer waiting periods for those seeking 
semi-urgent or non-urgent care in EDs and more instances of EDs 
being put on “drive-by” status, in which they reach full capacity 
and can accept no further ambulance admissions.126 The current 
nursing shortage in many areas compounds the problem, with an 
average nationwide vacancy rate of 13%.127 Beds that are not 
staffed cannot be used.128 
Third, several recent studies indicate that the increase in ED 
use in recent years is not predominantly due to visits by the 
uninsured seeking help for non-emergent conditions. Rather, 
                                                          
122 AHA, HOSPITAL STATISTICS 2 (2003). 
123 Robert W. Derlet, Overcrowding in Emergency Departments: Increased 
Demand and Decreased Capacity, 39 ANN. EMERGENCY MED. 430, 431 (Apr. 
2002). This is true, despite evidence that the number of ED beds increased in 
California, at least, during the 1990s, despite the decline in the total number of 
both hospitals and EDs in the state. See, e.g., MELNICK, supra note 120; Susan 
Lambe et al., Trends in the Use and Capacity of California’s Emergency 
Departments, 1990 – 1999, 39 ANN. EMERGENCY MED. 389, 393 (Apr. 2002). 
124 See, e.g., Grant D. Innes et al., Prospective Time Study Derivation of 
Emergency Physician Workload Predictors, 7 CAN. J. EMERGENCY MED. 299, 
303–04 (2005). 
125 See, e.g., Robert W. Derlet & John R. Richards, Emergency Department 
Overcrowding in Florida, New York and Texas, 95 SO. MED. J. 848 (Aug. 2002). 
126 See, e.g., Stephen Trzeciak & E. P. Rivers, Emergency Department 
Overcrowding in the United States: An Emerging Threat to Patient Safety and 
Public Health, 20 EMERGENCY MED. J. 402, 403–04 (2003). 
127 See CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION, supra note 120, at 2. 
128 See, e.g., Derlet, supra note 123, at 431. 
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insured patients are largely the ones using the ED in this way.129 
As the privately insured greatly outnumber the uninsured, the 
impact of the increase in privately insured patients is 
correspondingly larger.130 Patients often seek non-emergent care at 
the ED because they cannot take time off of work during regular 
business hours to see their regular doctor or because they wish to 
see a doctor more quickly than they could if they scheduled an 
appointment with their regular provider.131 With the loosening of 
curbs by managed care organizations, providers also feel 
increasingly free to refer patients to EDs.132 These visits are 
predominantly non-urgent.133 
For some who would like to lay blame for ED overcrowding, 
EMTALA is a convenient target. As noted above, Congress, by 
enacting EMTALA, imposed a requirement of charity care on 
private physicians and hospitals.134 In the decades prior to 
EMTALA, charity care was a voluntary undertaking on the part of 
healthcare providers, one they performed as a matter of 
professional pride and custom.135 By requiring private EDs to 
screen anyone who presents in the ED for an emergency medical 
                                                          
129 According to one study, while the number of uninsured seeking care at 
EDs did in fact increase between 1996 and 2001 by 10.3 percent, the percentage 
of privately insured patients seeking ED care increased far more significantly, 
by 24.3 percent during the same time period. Cunningham & May, supra note 
14, at 3. 
130 In 2004, 15.7 percent of the U.S. population was uninsured, whereas 
68.1 percent was privately insured (through employment or otherwise). 
DENAVAS-WALT, supra note 72, at 16. 
131 See, e.g., id. This is not a new phenomenon, either. See, e.g., Howard R. 
Kelman & Dorothy S. Lane, Use of the Hospital Emergency Room in Relation to 
the Use of Private Physicians, 66 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1189, 1190 (1976) 
(finding that 51 percent of suburban individuals seeking care in EDs had a 
regular primary care physician (PCP), but came to the ED because the physician 
was not available at the time that care was needed, and that a further 15 percent 
were referred by their PCP because they needed services that the PCP did not 
offer). 
132 Cunningham & May, supra note 14, at 3. 
133 Id. 
134 See supra Section III.A. 
135 See id. 
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condition and to provide care to anyone with such a condition, 
regardless of their ability to pay, Congress turned a once-voluntary 
undertaking into a compulsory one. Without an internalization of 
Congress’ mandate, providers, who might at one time willingly 
have provided at least some charity care through EDs, may resent 
their perceived loss of autonomy.136 As such, they may be more 
likely to characterize matters such as poor revenues, loss of ED 
staff, and overcrowding as EMTALA’s inevitable fallout. 
Additionally, EMTALA unintentionally invites scapegoating of 
the poor and uninsured. The statute itself provides no method or 
funds for compensating providers for any free care they may 
render in its compliance. Medicare and Medicaid provide a small 
amount of compensation to help offset losses incurred through 
treating the indigent and providing emergency medical care to 
illegal immigrants, but the compensation is partial and indirect, 
and goes only to hospitals rather than to physicians or other 
individual providers.137 Physicians and hospitals complain that the 
uninsured and Medicaid patients are deliberately taking advantage 
of EMTALA’s directive to screen patients regardless of their 
ability to pay and that these patients clog EDs with routine medical 
problems.138 Employers who provide health insurance to their 
employees complain that their premiums are sharply rising in part 
to subsidize healthcare provided to the growing ranks of the 
uninsured and publicly insured.139 If one took such reports as true 
and looked no further, one might start to think that if only the 
uninsured and publicly insured would simply take responsibility 
for their own healthcare costs, ED overcrowding and healthcare 
premium inflation would ease, state and federal budget crises 
would cease, and the U.S. public could happily and responsibly 
enjoy the fruits of marvelous medical advances, many of which 
                                                          
136 See, e.g., Roger J. Lewis, Academic Emergency Medicine and the 
“Tragedy of the Commons,” 11 ACAD. EMERG. MED. 423 (2004). 
137 See, e.g., Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization 
Act (“Medicare Modernization Act”), Pub. L. 108-173, Title X, § 1011, 117 
Stat. 2432 (Dec. 8, 2003). 
138 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 136. 
139 See, e.g., Stan Freeman, Legislature, Employers Struggle with Insurance 
Issue, THE REPUBLICAN, Feb. 5, 2006, at 31. 
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would be within the reach of most people’s budgets. 
Unfortunately, it is not that simple. Some once thought that the 
enactment of Medicare and Medicaid was the first incremental step 
towards universal coverage of all Americans.140 As noted earlier, 
in 1970 nearly all Americans enjoyed some form of health 
coverage, largely through the private market.141 Perhaps more 
Americans at that time had health insurance because they were 
more responsible and prudent than they are today; however, this is 
not likely the case. Consistent double-digit increases in healthcare 
costs and premiums, rather than a rapid lapse into irresponsibility, 
contributed to the erosion of private coverage.142 By 1977, nearly 
14% of the population was uninsured.143 The year before 
EMTALA was enacted, over 17% of the U.S. public lacked health 
insurance.144 
Congress, having just experienced two major attempts to enact 
some form of national health coverage in the prior decade, 
expected EMTALA to merely be a short-term fix, something to 
help tide the uninsured, underinsured and publicly insured through 
medical emergencies until some form of expansive or universal 
coverage had been enacted.145 Congress understood that the poor 
and uninsured were not causing the problem of dumping, let alone 
the problems of medical inflation and health insurance. Rather, the 
poor and uninsured were the victims of these problems. No one in 
Congress debated their need for assistance.146 
What would have happened had EMTALA not been enacted? 
Particularly in those states in which private EDs had no legal 
obligation to examine or treat uninsured and public-pay patients, it 
                                                          
140 See, e.g., ALAN DERICKSON, HEALTH SECURITY FOR ALL 136–37 
(2005). 
141 See supra note 69. 
142 See supra notes 70-72 and associated text. 
143 Randall R. Bovbjerg & William G. Kopit, Coverage and Care for the 
Medically Indigent: Public and Private Options, 19 IND. L. REV. 857, 860 
(1986). 
144 Id. 
145 See supra note 97 and associated text. 
146 See supra note 93 and associated text. It surely did not hurt that 
EMTALA required no new federal expenditures. 
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is conceivable that the shifting of the indigent emergency caseload 
from private to public EDs would have increased whenever 
possible.147 Indigent and other patients whom the hospital or staff 
found “undesirable” certainly would have suffered. Public 
hospitals also would have suffered, even more than they do under 
present conditions, as the shift could easily have led to paralyzing 
numbers of patients seeking care in their EDs.148 
In such a case, one of three scenarios would likely have come 
about. In the first scenario, the local, state, and/or federal 
governments would have had to increase taxes significantly to 
cover the increased volume and concordant shortfalls in public 
hospital revenues. In the second scenario, many public hospitals 
would have had to close, depriving millions of uninsured and 
public-pay patients of a major source of healthcare. In the third 
scenario, most remaining states would likely have enacted a 
requirement that all hospitals with an ED must screen and, if 
necessary, treat all patients presenting to their EDs with an 
emergent condition. Either of the first two would likely have 
significantly destabilized our predominantly private healthcare 
system. The third might not have had significant efficacy, judging 
by problems that were known to exist even in states like Illinois, 
where such a law had been in effect for decades.149 
If any of the hypotheses given above are correct, even in part, 
then EMTALA has acted as a safety valve for our present 
healthcare system. Dumping still occurs and public hospitals still 
treat a disproportionate number of uninsured and publicly insured 
individuals in their EDs. Nonetheless, the public hospital system 
continues to function and the uninsured and publicly insured 
usually can obtain emergency care. This is the case in part because 
private EDs and physicians are required to examine and, if 
necessary, treat patients who present in EDs without regard to their 
ability to pay, and the federal government can hold them 
                                                          
147 This may have been the result especially with the onset of the managed 
care revolution that further reduced private-pay revenue. 
148 Some would argue that we presently have reached such a situation. See, 
e.g., Lewis, supra note 136. 
149 See supra note 11 and associated text. 
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responsible for failing to do so.150 In exchange, our private system 
of healthcare continues to exist, and private actors can continue to 
reap significant profits from it.151 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Entities can survive with inadequate revenues only for a 
limited period of time. It may be that, by requiring hospitals and 
physicians to evaluate and, if necessary, treat patients without 
regard to compensation, Congress assumed that these healthcare 
providers had sufficient revenues to pick up the added 
responsibility without going bankrupt. Alternatively, Congress 
may have deemed the loss of some healthcare providers to be 
acceptable in the face of the problem of patient-dumping and the 
desire to provide for the problem without taking any politically 
unpalatable step such as raising taxes, cutting services elsewhere, 
or taking up the issue of national health insurance yet again.152 
Whatever the rationale, however, the outcome is not reasonable. 
The federal government ought to directly assist all affected 
hospitals and healthcare providers in funding EMTALA, if 
EMTALA’s obligations are to continue.153 While EMTALA’s 
goals should be supported, the federal government abdicated its 
responsibility by allocating the burden of financing the obligation 
                                                          
150 See supra Section I. 
151 That being said, little if any of the burden from EMTALA is felt by 
some of the most profitable sectors of the private healthcare industry: managed 
care entities and pharmaceutical companies. Regarding MCOs and EMTALA, 
see infra Section IV. 
152 For a discussion of the numerous attempts that have been made over the 
last century to enact universal health coverage in the United States, see 
DERICKSON, supra note 140. 
153 While DSH payments from the federal government provide funds to 
those hospitals serving a particularly large number of indigent patients, it does 
not provide for every hospital serving the indigent through ED or other services. 
Moreover, such payments do not provide for all or even most uncompensated 
care even for those hospitals that do receive such payments, and the 
Administration has threatened changes to the program that would effectively 
reduce DSH payments from their present levels. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 89. 
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to screen and treat onto hospitals and ED physicians.154 
The financial problems caused by EMTALA would further be 
eased if the federal government required health insurers to pay for 
emergency care using a “prudent layperson” standard.155 Many 
managed care organizations (MCOs) require their subscribers to 
obtain preauthorization for treatment. Such MCOs may refuse to 
pay for emergency care in the absence of preauthorization, 
claiming that it was medically unnecessary, that no emergency 
condition existed, or that the hospital was out-of-network.156 
Because EMTALA prohibits EDs from delaying care to inquire 
about health insurance status, many assume that they cannot call a 
patient’s insurer to request preauthorization, for fear of running 
afoul of the statute.157 Compounding this issue, CMS clearly 
provides that hospitals must delay discussing with a patient his or 
her ability to pay until after it begins stabilizing treatment.158 
The problem is mitigated in part, in that nearly all states require 
health insurers to pay for emergency care, even where the patient 
did not receive preauthorization for treatment.159 Most such laws 
provide that, as long as a “prudent layperson” might have thought 
the care to be urgent, given the patient’s symptoms, the insurer 
                                                          
154 The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act 
of 2003 takes a step towards compensating emergency departments and their 
physicians for providing emergency care to undocumented aliens. From 2005–
2008, the Act allocates $250 million to be distributed according to a formula to 
compensate providers for treating undocumented aliens under EMTALA. See 
supra note 137. It remains to be seen whether DSH payments will undergo a 
corresponding reduction. 
155 If the federal government were to enact such a provision, it would 
circumvent the problem of ERISA preemption, unlike doing so at the state level. 
For further discussion see, e.g., John D. Blum, Overcoming Managed Care 
Regulatory Chaos Through a Restructured Federalism, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 
327, 334–35 (2001). 
156 See, e.g., GAO EMERGENCY CARE, supra note 29, at 13. 
157 Recent changes to the regulations clarify that a physician or hospital 
may seek authorization, but only after a screening examination has occurred and 
stabilization has been initiated. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(4)(ii) (West 2006). 
158 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(4). 
159 See Mark A. Hall, The Impact and Enforcement of Prudent Layperson 
Laws, 43 ANN. EMERGENCY MED. 558 (2004). 
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must pay. However, because of the preemption provisions of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), federal law 
preempts such laws in their application to self-funded health 
insurance plans sponsored by an employer.160 This is a significant 
issue, because over half of all employees with employment-based 
health insurance are covered by a self-funded plan.161 Federal 
regulation is therefore necessary in order to bring all privately 
insured individuals under the protection of the prudent layperson 
standard.162 
As noted above, hospital capacity significantly affects the flow 
of patients through the ED and the number of inpatient beds has 
been declining for decades.163 Patients who are admitted through 
the ED must remain in the ED until an inpatient bed is free.164 If no 
inpatient bed is free, then the patient unnecessarily consumes both 
ED bed space and staff resources that could otherwise be used to 
attend another patient.165 Yet, few hospitals will expand their 
capacity if they are not certain the beds will be filled with 
sufficient frequency to justify the expense.166 Such certainty is in 
small supply at present, with declining public reimbursements and 
continued pressure from insurers to minimize inpatient stays.167 
Additionally, in those areas in which hospitals are having difficulty 
                                                          
160 See, e.g., Blum, supra note 155, at 334-35. 
161 See KAISER FAM. FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2005 ANNUAL 
SURVEY 109 (2005) 
162 Prudent layperson standards have been proposed in a variety of federal 
“patients’ rights” bills proposed at the federal level but, to date, none have 
passed, and passage looks increasingly unlikely as the HMO subscription rate 
declines and other, more pressing matters intrude on Congress. For further 
discussion see, e.g., Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United 
States: A Proposal for a More Functional System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL. 
1 (2005). 
163 See supra note 122 and associated text. 
164 See supra notes 123-24 and associated text. 
165 See id. 
166 See, e.g., supra notes 120-21 and associated text. 
167 For further discussion regarding declining public reimbursements, see 
Jonathan Weisman, Tentative Agreement Reached on Budget, WASH. POST, Dec. 
18, 2005 (discussing the 2006 budget, which level-funded physicians under 
Medicare, narrowly averting a four percent cut that was supposed to be enacted). 
HERMER MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006 12:35 PM 
 EMTALA AND EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS 729 
meeting their present staffing needs, they may be further unlikely 
to seek to expand their number of inpatient beds, each of which 
will require nursing and other staff support, not to mention further 
infrastructure. Persuading hospitals with overburdened EDs to 
expand their inpatient capacity would, absent new financial 
incentives, be a difficult sell at best. 
It might be suggested that hospitals could be encouraged, likely 
through financial support or other means, to open and staff urgent 
care centers near or adjacent to their EDs.168 These centers would 
specifically solicit patients in need of non-emergent care on a 
walk-in basis, and would be open during early morning, evening 
and weekend hours, as well as during regular business hours. 
Nevertheless, such centers could allow non-emergency patients to 
self-select a more appropriate option for care.169 
This option would probably do little to solve ED woes, 
however. On the positive side of the ledger, it might reduce the 
patient volume in the ED waiting room, reduce wait times for non-
urgent patients who self-selected to urgent care centers, and direct 
non-emergent care to more appropriate resources. But encouraging 
non-urgent patients to seek care elsewhere would likely not 
significantly speed the flow of patients through the ED, as truly 
emergent cases generally account for much of the hold up.170 
Additionally, private urgent care centers might cherry-pick the 
                                                          
168 Community health centers could also be opened for such purposes, with 
expanded hours. However, they can be hampered by problems with funding and 
insufficient staffing, among other issues. See, e.g., Jessamy Taylor, The 
Fundamentals of Community Health Centers, NHPF BACKGROUND PAPER 17, 
23 (Aug. 31, 2004), available at www.communityclinics.org/ 
files/848_file_NHPF_CHC_Fundamentals.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
169 Patients who chose to be seen through the emergency room would of 
course need to be screened prior to being directed to the urgent care center, and 
patients who came to the urgent care center would need to be screened and, if 
necessary, stabilized pursuant to EMTALA’s requirements. See CMS, 
MEDICARE PROGRAM: CLARIFYING POLICIES RELATED TO THE RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF MEDICARE-PARTICIPATING HOSPITALS IN TREATING INDIVIDUALS WITH 
EMERGENCY MEDICAL CONDITIONS 60-62 (2003), available at 
new.cms.hhs.gov/EMTALA/Downloads/CMS-1063-F.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 
2006). 
170 See supra notes 123-24 and associated text. 
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well-insured patients from the poorly-insured or uninsured ones, 
leaving the latter to obtain care from the ED. It makes little sense 
to seek to improve EDs’ financial and administrative outlooks by 
draining better-paying patients from the ED. 
While some of these proposals may offer small improvements, 
they do not touch the heart of the problem. EMTALA is necessary 
because our healthcare system leaves forty-five million Americans 
without coverage.171 It is necessary because healthcare providers 
commonly obtain more generous reimbursement from private 
insurers than from Medicaid or Medicare.172 It is necessary 
because our country has a long legacy of racial and economic 
discrimination that, while certainly improved from prior decades, 
still solidly exists today, albeit often in more subtle forms than in 
the past.173 
An expansion of public health insurance to cover more of those 
who presently lack insurance would help matters, but only if 
provider reimbursements were also raised.174 For a more complete 
solution, we must once again return to the prospect of some form 
of national health coverage. Only when everyone has the same 
baseline coverage for basic medical benefits, including emergency 
care, will we genuinely see the problem of dumping, and of 
blaming the poor and uninsured for our healthcare crises, dissipate. 
Additionally, we may also need to reconsider the organization 
and control of our hospital system. Voluntary associations such as 
nonprofit hospitals are often conceived of as having a distinctly 
and positively American flavor, largely due to decades of lobbying 
by interested organizations.175 Voluntary health entities 
“encourage[] the individual to enter into associations and 
organizations of his own choosing, encouraging the individual to 
provide health protection for his family through his own effort.”176 
As such, they are “tied in not only with democracy and American 
                                                          
171 See DENAVAS-WALT, supra note 72, at 16. 
172 See supra note 64 and associated text. 
173 See supra notes 73-80 and associated text. 
174 See, e.g., R. E. Santerre, The Inequity of Medicaid Reimbursement in the 
United States, 1 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL’Y, 25, 31 (2002). 
175 See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 36, at 224. 
176 Id. 
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initiative, but with other traditional structures of American life.”177 
One probably could make similar claims now about for-profit 
institutions, as well. 
Yet, if we want to continue supporting such systems, we need 
to understand that they come at a certain cost. With respect to 
emergency services, many EDs will continue to experience 
significant overcrowding and placement on drive-by status as 
hospital bed capacity continues to diminish because of concerns 
about profit maximization.178 To help remain in the black, private 
hospitals must maintain high occupancy rates, allowing for little 
slack if a greater than expected number of patients need to be 
admitted from the ED.179 More centralized public control and 
funding of our hospital system would allow us to determine, 
through an open and public process, whether we wish to commit 
the additional revenue it would take to increase inpatient bed 
capacity in areas regularly experiencing overcrowding and other 
issues.180 Seeking greater public control of our hospital system in 
response to this one issue alone is surely excessive. Nevertheless, 
we must add the issue of ED overcrowding and its causes to the list 
of reasons we may want to rethink our present system of hospital 
organization, control, and finance. 
CONCLUSION 
EMTALA was intended only to be a stopgap measure until 
Congress finally succeeded in implementing universal or near-
universal health coverage.181 The crises in emergency care demand 
attention. We can take a number of small steps to improve care and 
reimbursement under EMTALA. Nevertheless, ED overcrowding, 
                                                          
177 Id. 
178 See supra notes 120-24 and associated text. 
179 See supra notes 120-21 and associated text. 
180 Such a system is not, however, a panacea for the problem. See, e.g., D. 
M. Fatovich et al., Access Block Causes Emergency Department Overcrowding 
and Ambulance Diversion in Perth, Western Australia, 22 EMERGENCY MED. J. 
351 (2005); Laura Eggertson, ED Problems Result of Bed Shortages, Doctors 
Contend, 170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1653 (2004). 
181 See supra note 97 and associated text. 
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along with the ever-rising tide of the uninsured, suggest that 
EMTALA can no longer stave off the need to revisit plans to 
implement universal health coverage in this country. 
In 2004, 45.8 million Americans, or 15.6% of the population, 
were uninsured.182 Medicaid covered another 12.4% of the 
population.183 These individuals represent the bulk of the 
“undesirables” in the U.S. healthcare system—those from whom 
private hospitals and other providers can expect the least economic 
return, and have the least interest in treating. While they may lack 
resources, the uninsured are not the primary cause of the present 
problems our emergency departments are experiencing. Rather, a 
combination of factors, including increased ED use by both insured 
and uninsured populations, an increase in the severity of illness 
with which ED patients are presenting, and an inadequate supply 
of available inpatient beds for ED patients who need to be 
admitted, contribute significantly to the problem. Changes in 
healthcare finance that have constricted the ability of providers to 
shift costs from unprofitable to profitable ventures, and from the 
poorly insured to the well insured, and that have thrown the 
healthcare market open to increasing competition among private 
providers, have placed further tensions on EDs. The solution to 
these problems has little if anything to do with EMTALA itself. 
Rather, they are symptoms of greater problems within the 
healthcare system of this country. 
There are, to be sure, smaller steps we can take to help 
ameliorate certain problems with the provision of emergency care 
in the United States. We can federally prohibit managed care 
organizations from requiring preauthorization for care given in 
EDs in order to be reimbursed. We can also expand eligibility and 
improve provider reimbursements for our public healthcare 
programs. But as long as we continue with our present largely 
voluntary and private system of healthcare, we will continue to 
face significant problems that impact well beyond ED 
overcrowding. As noted in Congress two decades ago, EMTALA 
was meant merely to be a stopgap measure to help protect some of 
                                                          
182 See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 72, at 16. 
183 See id. Medicare covered 13.7 percent. Id. 
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the most vulnerable members of our populace until we overhauled 
our system of health insurance and healthcare organization and 
finance. It is time once again to set ourselves to this task. 
 
